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Abstract 
 Despite its fundamental role as to the very existence of humans and their economies, 
the provision of clean water to their citizens remains a challenge to governments across the 
globe.  This challenge presents itself as a classic interdisciplinary opportunity to blend 
science, law, and economics into an adaptive management solution ensuring the availability 
of this critical resource to all of the earth‘s inhabitants, regardless of location or 
socioeconomic status.  This paper will explore how countries manage transboundary water 
resources, and how cooperative strategies may emerge that benefit each country that shares an 
international river or lake.  In particular, this research explores how game theory and 
international treaties integrate the natural geospatial and temporal variability of hydrologic 
cycles into malleable instruments that ensure water supply and quality even in times of 
drought.  Drawing on the long-term feedback available from the United States‘ and Mexico‘s 
International Boundary and Water Commission treaty for the Rio Grande River (and several 
smaller transboundary rivers), this paper asserts that even narrowly self-interested states can 
reach agreements in managing scarce water resources that lead to non-zero sum outcomes and 
the availability of clean water at all times for their citizenry. 
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Introduction  
 The potential for conflict over shared, scarce water resources should not surprise even 
the greatest of optimists.  A finite (albeit naturally cyclic) resource like water is subject to 
significant impacts as global human population continues to rise.  With increases in 
population come growing threats from climate change, pollution, and general 
overexploitation of the earth‘s freshwater.  Novel approaches to allocation of international 
water resources will require the creativity to meet an ever-increasing demand, in a manner 
that is sustainable to the planet‘s environment and to future generations.  With estimates 
ranging from 215 to 268 international watersheds, covering nearly half of the world‘s surface, 
opportunities abound for both cooperation and conflict alike.
150
  In seeking cooperative 
outcomes, a wide variety of international agreements, such as treaties, commissions, and 
conferences, have been pursued throughout recent world history.  The present research draws 
from one such of these major instruments: the United States‘ (U.S.) and Mexico‘s 
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). 
 A brief overview of the unique challenges that exist with respect to international water 
rights is first necessary.  At its core, the allocation of water, before it is ever in dispute among 
                                                          
150
 Clare Shine and Cyrille de Klemm, Wetlands, Water and the Law: Using law to advance wetland 
conservation and wise use(1999), at 271; Stephen E. Draper, Model Water Sharing Agreements for the Twenty-
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humans, is first subject to the laws of nature.  Some regions are naturally water-rich, while 
others are bone-dry.  Hydroclimatological conditions are more of a burden for some countries 
than others, with the poorest countries left most vulnerable.
151
  Additionally, the hydrologic 
cycle is prone to inter-annual variation, resulting in prolonged droughts in many regions of 
the world, conditions that are expected to be exacerbated by climate change in the coming 
years.  This inherent natural variability, both geospatially and temporally, ultimately dictates 
the ground rules for water resource allocation.  Predictive tools, such as surface water and 
groundwater models that integrate water supply variability, are the lynchpin of an emerging 
interdisciplinary body of science, international law, and economics that is the focus of this 
study.  The IBWC is one attempt to merge these bodies of thought into a malleable and 
adaptive management tool. 
 The IBWC, comprised of the U.S. and Mexico, ―relate[s] to the utilization of the 
waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande,‖ which are a series of 
large, transboundary rivers (Figure 1).
152
  The Rio Grande in particular is one of the most 
water-stressed watersheds in the world.
153
  The IBWC is best described as a series of treaties 
that govern the allocation of water resources shared between the two nations.  Originating in 
1884 and evolving since, the agreement between the two nations has consistently served as a 
starting point for conflict resolution and cooperation regarding freshwater supply.Although 
many of the substantive allocation issues were drafted in the IBWC‘s primary 1944 treaty, it 
remains a dynamic document reflecting changes in the hydrologic and diplomatic 
environment shared by the U.S. and Mexico.
154
  Among the oldest of such agreements in the 
world, the IBWC provides the opportunity for long-term assessment of the instrument‘s 
efficacy, and it has been previously identified as a model for international water dispute 
resolution.
155
  While leaving some things to be desired, including equal bargaining power 
between the parties, the IBWC is a binding international treaty that can function as a model 
for cooperative water allocation in other water-scarce, transboundary regions. 
 
Figure 1.  The U.S. - Mexico Border (including transnational waterways in red).
156 
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 Operating under the assumption that water is a public economic good, and that water 
treaties are essentially contracts for the allocation of this commodity, the goal of this research 
is to assess, post facto, the successes and lessons learned from the IBWC and attempt to use 
this knowledge to aid the drafting of future water rights treaties.  The method to be used for 
this analysis is a body of economics known as game theory.  Game theory provides a useful 
framework for analyzing the strategic decision-making of riparian states, but is still in its 
nascent stages as a pre-drafting tool.
157
  Ultimately, this assessment seeks to turn hindsight 
into foresight in the creation of equitable and sustainable instruments of international water 
resource development rights, evidenced by the recommendations made in Section IV, infra. 
 
Background 
Primer in International Water Law 
 Generally, international rivers are those fluvial waters which flow within drainage 
basins that span at least two countries.
158
  This definition has expanded over the years to 
include international catchments, as international water law has embraced the watershed 
approach to water resource management.
159
  Central to the study of international water law is 
the notion of a riparian state, which refers to a country where an international river is 
located.
160
  Of further importance are the distinctions between upstream riparian states and 
downstream ones and the changing roles states play as water tumbles toward the sea.
161
  A 
major theme of the present analysis will thus focus on the equitable and sustainable 
distribution of the waters from international rivers among multiple riparian states.  This 
theme, of course, raises new questions: What is equitable and what is sustainable? 
 Equitability is a concept that has manifest itself as the principle of equitable utilization 
over the past forty-plus years of water law development.
162
  In 1970, Finland recommended to 
the United Nations (U.N.) that non-navigability use agreements for international watercourses 
should strive for ―an equitable apportionment of shared water resources.‖163  Somewhat 
unsurprisingly, this call for new rules was met with belligerence by many of the world‘s 
upstream riparian states.
164
  Not until 1997 did accord occur, when the U.N. adopted the 
seminal ―Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses‖ 
(Convention) and notions of equitability, sustainability, cooperation, and conflict resolution 
were forever etched into the stone of far-reaching international agreements.
165
 
 The Convention calls on riparian states to use and develop international watercourses 
with consideration of other riparian states‘ interests and an eye towards protection of the 
waterbody.
166
These rights and duties are framed at a rote level in terms of morality, that 
―people should be guaranteed this vital water as part of their human rights.‖167The 
Convention also sets the stage for cooperative arrangements in the allocation of international 
water resources.  While recognizing the right to utilize a watercourse, the Convention also 
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creates a duty to cooperate among riparian states.
168
  This duty to cooperate theoretically 
necessitates negotiating fair distribution of the limited and shared waters among riparian 
states.
169
 
 If equitability refers to the present fairness in resource allocation, then sustainability 
encompasses notions of futurity as well.  To wit, sustainable development is, without 
hyperbole, the grand unified theory of the international environmental movement.  Hailed as a 
cure-all to the seeming mutual exclusivity of economic growth and environmental protection, 
sustainable development now thematically links every major international meeting and 
accord, since the famous 1987 Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future.
170
  
Nothing short of ground-breaking, Our Common Future simultaneously espoused the merits 
of sustainable development and multilateralism among states in pursuing shared (i.e., global) 
environmental goals.
171
  The progeny of the Brundtland Commission report include 1992‘s 
U.N. Earth Summit and Agenda 21 in Rio de Janeiro, which placed environmental issues, 
including water allocation, at the forefront of the global consciousness.
172
  The afterglow of 
this revolution was short-lived, however, as the prickly issues of who gets what (and when do 
they get it) persisted.
173
 
 The problem is that equitability and sustainability are not designed to 
prioritizeeconomic efficiency, yet states still seek to maximize the latter.  The aspirational 
tone of the Convention, Brundtland, and Rio is noble in theory but difficult to apply in 
practice.  Nonetheless, water rights law presents a serious and unique obstacle in its own 
right.  The commoditization of water, a substance implicit in the very survival of a human 
being, has added an economic component to a fundamental right.  The nightmarish scenario 
of already-impoverished (in terms of both wealth and water resources) nations not being able 
to afford to provide their citizens with adequate drinking water supplies is already 
occurring.
174
  Despite the rather unholy alliance of fundamental rights and economics, the 
nature of the issue requires creative solutions that rise above the aspirations of documents like 
the Convention, and embrace the dismal science.  With an uneasy acknowledgement of the 
intertwined destinies of water rights and economics, an introduction to the governing 
principles of game theory ensues. 
A. Game Theory and Resource Allocation Strategies 
 Because so much of international law is customary and not binding, per se, additional 
methods should be incorporated when implementing a transnational instrument governing 
water allocation.
175
  One such method is derived from economics, known as game theory, and 
can potentially be leveraged as a way to make water treaties more efficient in their design.  
The idea is based on the notion that having an understanding of the potential outcomes of a 
treaty, both desired and not desired, is advantageous in drafting an instrument that gears its 
signatories towards the optimum outcome for all states.
176
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 Game theory is the use of mathematical models to predict the behavior of two or more 
―players‖ in resource allocation scenarios where multiple outcomes are possible.177  
Generally, game theory refers to an analytical framework for assessing the likelihood of a 
particular social outcome.
178
  It comes with its own unique jargon, which will be introduced 
here.  The players (e.g., individuals, corporations, or, pertinent to the present research, 
riparian states) are the rational decision makers taking action.
179
Strategies refer to the 
alternatives each player has to choose from.
180
Information, either private (not known to all 
players) or public (known to all players), is the data upon which decisions are made.
181
  The 
players, strategies, and information are governed by the rules of the game, which include 
laws, regulations, treaties, and natural processes (e.g., hydrologic periodicity).
182
  Finally, 
there are social outcomes and payoffs.  Social outcomes refer to the end result of a particular 
scenario playing out, whereas payoffs relate to the individual player‘s valuation (i.e., gain or 
loss) of a given outcome.
183
 
 The strategies in the ―universe‖ of possible game theory approaches can be explained 
by use of a continuum (Figure 2).  On one extreme is the ―narrow self-interest‖ strategy 
where a player simply wants to maximize their own benefits, with zero consideration of the 
other players.
184
Any benefits accruing to the other players are solely the result of 
happenstance.  At the other extreme is ―pure altruism,‖ a strategy that is far less likely to be 
found in any real-world scenario.
185
  The altruistic player puts the benefit of the other players 
ahead of their own, even if it is to their detriment.  Neither of these strategies leads to a 
player‘s long-term success; the former is a recipe for conflict creation, while the latter lacks 
self-preservation.Generally, strategies fall somewhere in the middle; a primary goal of this 
research is to promote strategies that embrace cooperation in the allocation of scarce, 
transboundary freshwater resources. 
 
Figure 2.  A simplistic continuum depicting the range of game theory strategies. 
  
 Water allocation, in a game theory sense, is a non-zero sum game.  A non-zero sum 
game refers to a situation where player strategies may result in social outcomes where each 
player receives a net gain, commonly referred to as a ―win-win‖ scenario.186In this emerging 
field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in international law, zero sum games are revised 
as non-zero sum games, where fair division outcomes are the only acceptable solutions.  
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Although clean water is considered to be a finite resource, advancements in technology, 
environmental awareness, and cooperative strategies can optimize human ability to 
sustainably use this resource.
187
In the parlance of a famous American expression, it may thus 
be possible to have one‘s cake and eat it too. 
 Optimal resource utilization is the best case endgame scenario, from an economic 
perspective, in non-zero sum games.
188
Optimal refers to the players in the game each 
receiving their maximum possible shareover all possible scenarios.  However, strategies 
(unsurprisingly) tend toward narrow self-interest as a default starting position in negotiations.  
When the moral imperative to provide water to your own people trumps the moral imperative 
to provide water to all people, the narrow self-interest strategy wins every time.  Optimal and 
economic efficient outcomes need cooperation by the players sharing the water resources to 
break logjams.
189
 
 Luckily, as this paper strives to demonstrate, narrow self-interest and cooperation are 
not mutually exclusive strategies.  Indeed, it is possible to imagine a scenario where one 
riparian state cooperates with their neighbor solely for preservation of their own interests.  
This type of cooperative behavior is exemplified in Egypt‘s dealings with the Nile River‘s 
upstream riparian states.
190
  The Nile River situation is best described as adversarial, with the 
tenuous Nile Water Agreement of 1929 and the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of 
the Nile dictating the terms of water allocation.
191
  There has been historically little love lost 
between Egypt and its upstream riparian states, with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat 
famously stating in 1979 that, ―The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is 
water.‖192  The 1929 and 1959 treaties do not reflect a spirit of cooperation; they are strictly 
utilitarian from a self-preservation standpoint.
193
The agreements are effective, however, as 
conflict has largely been avoided in the volatile Nile River basin, and a tragic outcome has 
not befallen what is indisputably a world treasure.
194
 
B. The Tragedy of the Commons 
 The tragedy of the commons, the classic scenario envisaged by Hardin (1968), is an 
apt descriptor of the failings of the pure narrow self-interest strategy in the absence of 
cooperation.
195
  The reader is asked to imagine a communal pasture (the commons) where 
herdsmen allow their cattle to graze.
196
  Initially, there is plenty of pasture to share among the 
cattle, whose population remains well below the carrying capacity of the commons.
197
  
Indeed, it is this ampleness that spurs the tragedy, as each herdsman asks, ―What is the utility 
to me of adding one more animal to my herd?‖198  Because the herdsman receives all of the 
benefits of having one more animal, while the increased strain of this animal on the commons 
is shared by all the herdsman, there is very little downside, at first.
199
  The rational herdsman 
decides to add another; however, in the absence of cooperation, so does every other 
herdsman, such that the commons collapses under the cumulative impacts of overgrazing
200
.  
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The commons can no longer support one animal or herdsman.
201
  This tragedy exemplifies the 
unfettered narrow self-interest strategy: casting a blind eye to the environment‘s limited 
carrying capacityleads to catastrophe.   
 The default position of self-maximization has real-world application in the water 
context.  The Aral Sea, in Central Asia, is a familiar example of a tragedy of the commons.  A 
victim of indiscriminate over-pumping for decades, the Aral Sea has become the poster child 
for environmental collapse.  The once-vast inland ―sea‖ (it is really a freshwater lake), has 
been steadily shrinking due to pumping stresses from the five countries that share its historic 
drainage basin.
202
  In a region that is prone to ethnic conflicts and has lacked stability since 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Aral Sea is precisely what can happen when 
cooperative strategies are lacking.
203
  The resulting collapse is clearly seen in Figure 3.  
Remarkably, despite a shared history that is less than conducive for cooperation, the five 
countries have recently recognized the regional importance of the Aral Sea and have 
begunworkshops to shape their shared future.
204
  Long-term security in the region depends, in 
large part, on an ability to cooperate with respect to the region‘s most significant freshwater 
resource.
205
  A tragedy of the commons has lead to a post facto cooperative outcome.  
Although an a priori solution is most desirable, progress is welcome in any form. 
 
Figure 3.  A real-life tragedy of the commons: the shrinking Aral Sea.
206
 
 
C. The Role of Science 
 In this effort to change hindsight into foresight regarding the drafting of international 
water allocation instruments, special attention must also be paid to the unique scientific ―law‖ 
that ultimately governs these issues.
207
  Before being bound by any contract, treaty, or 
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agreement, players in the international water ―game‖ are bound by the rules of nature.  
Hydrology is the first, and most significant, arbiter of water rights.  This fact does not, of 
course, render humans powerless to nature‘s whims, as mankind has routinely developed 
models based on long-term hydrological observations such that the floods and droughts that 
characterize our waterbodies are not surprising, even when not expected.  There exists a 
natural periodicity (and regular peaks and valleys) in the earth‘s water cycle that science has 
sought to understand for time immemorial.  The development of water storage facilities such 
as reservoirs is a testament to this fact.   
 With greater awareness comes greater predictability, which is the point of the present 
research.  Predictability is a grand goal when speaking of access to water, a fundamental need 
which is indisputable.Just as hydrologic modeling attempts to better understand our rivers, 
flexible agreements between states should recognize the inherent variability of surface water 
flows.
208
Embracing the same approaches taken in hydrologic studies to minimize 
unexpectedness in the drafting of water allocation instruments will arguably lead to more 
cooperation and a better diplomatic environment for dispute resolution.  Predictability equals 
terra firma in international dealings. 
 
Analysis 
A. Economic Asymmetries 
That disparities exist among the earth‘s states is self-evident: Asymmetries color the 
relationships between riparian states and they must be understood at the outset in treaty 
drafting.  For example, one very important (and fascinating) consideration is cultural 
differences and how they can help predict a state‘s behavior entering international water 
rights negotiations.
209
  A riparian state‘s level of risk aversion or environmental awareness 
can be an integral aspect of their cultural identity.  Additionally, a state may, as a matter of 
principle, give NGOs greater sway in intergovernmental negotiations.  A more open 
(democratic) regime may, for instance, culturally embrace bringing stakeholders to the 
proverbial table in negotiation and deal-making.
210
  This is a constructivist approach to 
international relations, which becomes validated over time as customary international law via 
the formation of treaties and agreements and through the interactions between groups and 
communities.
211
  Another example is economic asymmetries, which form the basis of the 
analysis portion of this study going forward.
212
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Economic asymmetries are best described as incongruities between two states in key 
indicators of economic development such as income or gross domestic product (GDP).
213
  
The interactions between two riparian states can be dictated by their relative economic 
circumstances.
214
  Disparity between two riparian states is not necessarily a formula for abuse 
of negotiating power; rather, a pattern of negotiated outcomes is observed, typically resulting 
in tradeoffs.
215
  The theory behind this phenomenon is explained by differential willingness to 
pay for a clean water supply among economically asymmetric riparian states.
216
Stated 
differently, riparian states may value differently the same level of access to water resources 
based on their economic circumstances. 
More affluent riparian states generally have more stringent standards for water 
quality, and have a higher willingness to pay for its public water supply.
217
  Conversely, less 
affluent riparian states may be inclined to accept lower quality water standards to meet its 
public demand.
218
   As a result, wealthier riparian states may make up the differencein the 
water quality of shared resources by incentivizing the poorer upstream riparian state to meet 
its higher downstream standards.
219
  The method most often employed to achieve this 
outcome is the side payment.
220
 
Side payments are an efficient method to align incongruent self-interests into a ―win-
win‖ outcome for two or more states.  While side payments are certainly an incentive to 
motivate a particular desired action out of an upstream riparian state (e.g., pollution 
abatement, reduced demand, or flood control), they also reflect the reality that some benefits 
enjoyed by the downstream state are created farther upstream.
221
Side payments are a type of 
tradeoff where cash is traded for an outcome that has a payoff at least in line with each 
riparian state‘s desired end game.  Therefore, effective side payments can be considered 
―win-win‖ outcomes: The upstream state gets cash, while the downstream state realizes gains 
in terms of water quality and/or supply. 
Sensitivity to another riparian state‘s economic situation can pay dividends to a state 
at a later date.
222
  This type of payoff, known as goodwill value, is a collateral (and deferred) 
payoff to the ―sensitive‖ state.223  Goodwill value accrues when a more affluent state takes on 
some or all of the costs of a shared water project or a negative externality (e.g., pollution) 
originating in the less affluent state, or when the richer riparian is disproportionately generous 
with a specific water allocation.  In this social outcome, the richer riparian state may choose 
to flout customary international law, such as the ―polluter pays principle,‖ or simply be 
generous, in an effort to cultivate a cooperative diplomatic milieu.
224
  Although a perverse 
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outcome, insofar as the victim of pollution or over-pumping also has to pay for the abatement 
of negative impacts, goodwill payoffs may yet result in a ―win‖ for the more affluent victim.  
The benefits may manifest as future compliance of the less affluent state with a shared water 
project that is beneficial to the wealthier riparian, or the benefits may be more general (e.g., 
less contentious diplomacy).
225
  The goodwill is essentially ―banked‖in trust for future use by 
the more affluent riparian.
226
 
B. The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
A generalized model for the relationship between affluence and environmental 
degradation is useful as a backdrop for a discussion about economic asymmetries between 
two riparian states.  The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) (Figure 4) demonstrates the 
rudimentary inverted U-shaped curve characteristic of this relationship.  It was originally 
developed in 1955 by Simon Kuznets to describe the relationship between affluence and 
income inequality over time and later adapted in the environmental context.
227
  Typically, it is 
hypothesized on an EKC that key indicators of environmental degradation such as pollution 
and resource depletion initially increase as a function of increasing economic development.
228
  
Adherents to the EKC phenomenon hypothesize that environmental protection is a low 
priority for developing countries that are focused more on establishing political, economic, 
and civic stability within its populace and with its trade partners and neighbors.
229
  However, 
as per capita income increases over time, environmental degradation slowly begins to occur at 
a decreasing rate, as priorities shift to meet a growing need for resource protection and 
pollution abatement.
230
  Examples of this phenomenon in the U.S. are the National Parks 
Service, the EPA (and a host of other agencies), and complex regulatory schemes such as the 
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Endangered Species Act.  It is argued that more 
affluent states pursue cleaner, more ―information-intensive industries and services‖ while 
better enforcing their environmental regulations and spending more money on conservation 
initiatives.
231
 
 
Figure 4.  The environmental Kuznets curve. 
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Rather than debate the merits of the EKC theory, this research instead chooses to 
apply it in the limited context of the priorities of two riparian states where economic 
asymmetries exist between the players.  Reaping the benefits of this approach in the 
development of strategies in water allocation agreements starts with embracing its core tenets; 
that is, countries‘ environmental strategies (which include water allocation strategies) change 
as a function of their overall wealth.  This notion fits well the reality of economic 
asymmetries between neighboring riparian states.  It is thus understandable to see how narrow 
self-interest, as a default strategy, is reinforced by economic asymmetries, especially as 
poorer states attempt to protect those resources that are already under their control.  However, 
this knowledge can also be used to aid strategy-making, a priori, in water allocation 
agreements.  Returning to the IBWC, the very acceptance of this reality with respect to the 
U.S.-Mexico relationship has colored their agreements in the Rio Grande Basin for decades 
and resulted in social outcomes that differ markedly from customary international law and 
default strategies. 
Turning now to the real-world implications of this model, the IBWC will be analyzed 
for examples of negotiated tradeoffs that represent ―win-win‖ scenarios for the U.S. and 
Mexico.
232
  (It is assumed for the purposes of this research that the EKC‘s predictions apply 
to the two riparian states and that the U.S. occupies a position farther along the X-axis than 
Mexico.
233)  Specific examples exist in the IBWC‘s history that demonstrate the 
aforementioned strategies of side payments (also known as cost-sharing) and goodwill value.  
Wastewater treatment and treaty amendment are two of the IBWC settings which illustrate 
the cooperative principles predicted by game theory. 
A key consideration of the IBWC, above basic supply, is water quality.
234
  As such, 
three international wastewater treatment facilities have been built in U.S.-Mexico border 
metropolitan areas as a result of the IBWC: San Diego-Tijuana, Calexico-Mexicali, and 
Laredo-Nuevo Laredo.
235
  These joint construction projects are cost-intensive; but instead of 
apportioning costs based on population served or the amount of influent coming into the 
facility from each riparian state, the costs were distributed based on benefits received.
236
  The 
facilities were designed to meet the U.S.‘ higher water quality mandate.237  Coupled with the 
higher willingness to pay of the U.S., a solution was negotiated where the U.S. assumed a 
higher portion of the construction costs, even though Mexico was receiving the benefit of 
cleaner water as well.
238
  Further, as U.S. standards continue to rise, the U.S. makes side 
payments to the Mexico for the increased cost of operations in meeting these effluent 
benchmarks.
239
  A ―win-win‖ outcome has occurred, with U.S. sanitation standards being met 
and Mexico receiving just compensation.  
Amendments to the IBWC, such as cost-apportioning and side payment agreements, 
occur often and with little dispute between the two riparian parties to the agreement.
240
  Using 
―Minutes‖ to amend the IBWC, the treaty is built on a foundation of trust and good faith.  
Whena change is desired to the IBWC, one of the parties simply makes the alteration, referred 
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to as a Minute, and the other party has 30 days to disapprove it.
241
  This general goodwill 
which surrounds the IBWC has specific instances of being parlayed into real-world payoffs.  
An example of this concerns the original drafting of the 1944 treaty.  The U.S. initially 
allotted a generous amount of water from the Colorado River to Mexico.
242
  As the southwest 
U.S. boomed, so did its water demands.  Subsequent Minutes to the IBWC, which conveyed 
new diversions from the Colorado River to the All-American Canal in California, as well as 
extractions from the lower Rio Grande, all of which solely benefitted the U.S., were approved 
by Mexico due, in part, to the goodwill accrued from the initial generous drafting of the 1944 
treaty.
243
 These amendments were not beneficial to Mexico, but the U.S. was essentially able 
to cash in its ―banked‖goodwill. 
C. Hypothetical Through-Border Situations 
In order to further illustrate the lessons from the IBWC, two instructive hypothetical 
scenarios have been developed for through-border rivers: 
1) Imagine a hypothetical two-state international river.  The downstream riparian 
state is at a point much farther along the EKC‘s X-axis than the upstream 
riparian state.  How can the downstream riparian state ensure that the quantity 
and quality of water in the river meets its higher demand and standards? 
 Because the richer downstream riparian state is in the disadvantageous position in this 
scenario, their strategy must reflect this reality.  With lower levels of environmental 
protections in place, the upstream riparian state is in the default position where its self-interest 
is served before meeting the more rigorous water quality standards of the more affluent 
nation.  Thus, in order to reach a negotiated outcome that is compatible with the richer state‘s 
higher standards, side payments for the higher level of upstream pollution abatement will 
have to be made.  The richer state can pay for (or share in the costs of) wastewater treatment 
at the source in the upstream portion of the international waterbody.  The more affluent 
riparian state would have to meet its internal water quality standards eventually; doing it at 
this upstream point also preserves the ecological integrity over a greater length of the river. 
2) Imagine once more a hypothetical two-state international river, except in this 
scenario, the situations are reversed and the upstream riparian state is at a point 
much farther along the EKC‘s X-axis than the downstream riparian state.  
What does game theory predict as to the upstream riparian‘s strategy? 
Goodwill value can be an example of a payoff to the richer upstream riparian state.  
Their higher willingness to pay for water resource preservation and water pollution abatement 
may pay dividends later (e.g., cooperation of the downstream riparian in joint projects such as 
hydropower generation or even non-water allocation issues).  This tradeoff outcome is 
mutually beneficial in that the downstream riparian received more and/or higher quality water 
while the upstream riparian has done a favor for its neighbor, which can reinforce further 
cooperation in the future.  The idea is that cooperation begets cooperation.  A word of 
caution: There is, however, the danger of paternalism, where the more affluent upstream 
neighbor dictates the terms of the agreement.
244
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D. Drafting Better International Water Allocation Agreements 
With both real-world and hypothetical examples of conflict avoidance and 
cooperation to draw upon, a final legal question materializes: Is it possible to create a model 
agreement for the governance of shared international water resources?  Or, in other words, are 
there certain universal lessons learned that can be accepted as fundamental to the coordinated 
allocation of water rights?  The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) believes so and 
has produced ―model‖ language for the drafting of water sharing agreements.  Rather 
audacious in its scope, the ASCE project, known as the Model Code for the Shared Use of 
Transboundary Water Resources (SUTWR), is the culmination of a decade-long response to 
the challenges set forth in the aforementioned questions.
245
  Ultimately, the SUTWR seeks 
pre-drafting efficiency, embracing many of the predictions made by game theoretic 
approaches to water allocation, including differential willingness to pay and tradeoffs, while 
still maintaining integrity with the broad international goals of equitability and 
sustainability.
246
 
The SUTWR recognizes the inherent difficulty in the economic valuation of water 
resources and that different values create controversy and the potential for conflict.
247
  In 
particular, two of the lessons learned from the IBWC with respect to economic asymmetries 
are reflected in the model code‘s provisions.  First, the model code recognizes that riparian 
states enter into negotiations in the default state of narrow self-interest.
248
  It does not, 
however, endorse maintaining such strategies in the code language, preferring instead to use 
language mirroring that of game theory.  The SUTWR creates a duty to coordinate, cooperate, 
and even share information among the stakeholder states in negotiating tenable outcomes for 
all.   
Second, the model code is cognizant of the differential willingness to pay of riparian 
states.
249
  The SUTWR mandates economic considerations in the creation of international 
allocation agreements.
250
  It states that tradeoffs, such as side payments, are useful tools for 
achieving balance in equitable and sustainable water use.
251
  Understanding that cooperation 
is oftentimes only bought and sold, there is a seamless integration of economic principles into 
the model code, despite its stated goal to put environmental conservation and human rights at 
the forefront.
252
  The SUTWR‘s thematic acceptance of the principles of equitable utilization 
and sustainability demonstrate that the economic predictions made by game theory, especially 
the tradeoffs derived from economic asymmetries, are compatible with the moral 
considerations made by the global community.
253
This interdisciplinary effort suggests that 
economic efficiency and the moral concerns of a fundamental right to water are by no means 
mutually exclusive goals. 
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Conclusion 
The field of international water law is one that appears to be at a crossroads; stuck 
between the feel-good sentiment of its major conventions and meetings and the reality of 
enacting these tenets in reality, problems obtaining results persist.  The importance of the 
field cannot be understated, yet there exist serious short-comings in the equitable and 
sustainable distribution of scarce international water resources.Rather than pretend that a one-
stop-shop for curing these ills exists, incremental change may be the best interim strategy on 
the global path to fulfilling the fundamental human right to water.  The magnanimous goals 
of the international community (equitability and sustainability) should continue to be pursued, 
while the less attractive goal of economic efficiency may in fact be the best project-specific 
approach to international water treaty drafting.  Game theoretic approaches, while limited in 
their scope of applicability, foster unifying themes of cooperation and collaboration, such that 
the dismal science may not be so out of touch with humanity after all. 
A. Limitations 
A notable omission from this study is the role of multinational corporations in the 
commoditization and distribution of water.  There is no dispute that major corporations 
control access to copious amounts of the world‘s freshwater, such as the ongoing dispute 
between Nestlé and Bolivia.
254
  And there is similarly no doubt that these entities should be 
considered key stakeholders in the context of cooperation and conflict resolution.  
Nonetheless, significant discussion of their role in international water law was left out of this 
study due to their (ostensible) exclusion from the instrument drafting process.  The 
partnership process, discussed infra., may change this dynamic in the future. 
It should also be noted that this research is not designed to be a blind devotional to the 
role of game theory in international treaty-making.  There is a danger in reducing all treaties 
to mere contractual agreements between states, especially when considering the international 
public interest that treaties are supposed to uphold.
255
  If treaties are nothing more than 
contracts between rational actors seeking to maximize their own benefits, then how can the 
global good ever be advanced?
256
  However, in many situations, such as the simplified two-
state scenarios discussed in this study, the illustrative qualities of game theory are evident.  
Game theory may or may not be capable of handling the myriad complexities of 
transboundary water rights, but it can serve as a novel starting point for understanding state 
(and other stakeholder) motivations and strategies and how to reach cooperative outcomes.
257
 
B. Recommendations 
Oftentimes, when the discussion turns to water resources, the ubiquitous term ―water 
war‖ springs up.  Recent water wars include such armed conflicts as the Cochabamba struggle 
in Bolivia in 1997 and the aforementioned ethnic clashes near the Aral Sea, as well as the 
slightly more civil interactions among southern and southwestern states of the U.S. and the 
omnipresent Nile River disputes between Egypt and the rest of the watershed‘s riparian 
states.
258
  This disturbing trend in the way water is discussed paints a pall over the entire area 
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of study such that conflict seems to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Thus, as a matter of 
international discursive policy, it is first recommended that a ―softening‖ of the terminology 
is pursued.  The widespread use of ―water war‖ does nothing but reinforce the default 
position of narrow self-interest and conflict.  
One recommendation is to consider local water use groups as the players, instead of 
the macro view where states are the sole players.  This suggestion has two primary benefits.  
The first benefit, characterized generically as site-specificity, is that these players already 
have intimate knowledge of the local water needs which would potentially lead to more 
efficient water use.
259
  The idea is that those closest to an issue (e.g., use groups like farmers 
or individual communities) would be most acquainted with the nuances of a specific water 
allocation problem.
260
 The second benefit is that NGOs, as a sophisticated entity representing 
use groups, could thus function as the stakeholder during treaty drafting, rather than merely 
trying to inform the state as one of many groups trying to get a seat at the table.
261
  In this 
scenario, the international instrument would serve as the governing document, implemented 
by the use groups actually impacted by water use on a given transnational waterbody.  
Ostensibly, this approach would minimize the degrees of separation between those using the 
resource and the instrument which governs this use.
262
  Cultural theory, touched on in the 
beginning of Section III, supra., which encourages community access to the negotiating 
process, reinforces the site-specific, user group approach.
263
 
With the possibility of an expanded role for NGOs in international treaty drafting 
come ever-creative solutions to coalition-building.  The rise of public-private partnerships is 
one such example of this logical progression.
264
  These partnerships are voluntary, 
multilateral collaborations of myriad environmental stakeholders, which function as 
intermediaries between the over-arching goals set forth in meetings such as Rio in 1992 or 
Johannesburg in 2002 and implementation at the local level.
265
  Rather than acting as 
substitutes for intergovernmental commitments, partnerships are designed to strengthen 
extant agreements by ―disaggregate[ing] general worldwide goals into specific local 
projects.‖266Drawing on the inherent advantage of NGOs, civil society, municipalities, and 
even private corporations in understanding local nuances, partnerships embody the site-
specific knowledge that is becoming increasingly necessary in negotiating effective water 
allocation agreements. 
Significant attention should be paid to unseen transnational waters, such asaquifers.
267
  
Aquifers are instrumental in nearly any state‘s freshwater supply regime.  But there is 
evidence that international aquifers lag behind their surface counterparts in terms of 
protections granted to them by international agreements.
268
  Despite Minutes which were 
adopted in two subsequent addendums to the IBWC, in 1973 and 1979, and the ―relatively 
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warm political relations‖ between the U.S. and Mexico, formal agreement on the allocation of 
transnational aquifers has yet to be achieved.
269
This failure to reach an accord underscores the 
difficulties groundwater resources still present toinstrument drafting. 
 A final substantive recommendation is for international water treaty drafting to 
incorporate the precautionary principle as a fundamental component of allocation 
instruments.  Harkening back to the unpredictability of the hydrologic cycle, the 
precautionary principle is a wise use (common-sense) approach to uncertain 
futures.
270
Borrowing from the law, the principle speaks generally about the burdens of proof 
in policy-making; where uncertainty exists with respect to environmental or public health, the 
burden rests on those promoting a particular course of action that it is not harmful.
271
  The 
sheer magnitude of the issue of clean water availability, already shrouded in uncertainty due 
to hydrologic variability, mandates the guarded approach of the precautionary principle.  The 
moral duty to provide clean water to mankind, as a fundamental right, should not be 
jeopardized by the whims of one player.
272
 
 Ultimately, there is still a great need for aspirational and far-reaching water rights 
treaties such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of Non-Navigable Uses of International 
Watercourses.  The Convention, and other treaties, such as the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) and the Ramsar Convention (Ramsar), and meetings, such as Rio and 
Johannesburg, galvanize shared goals and resonate throughout the international 
community.
273These instruments shouldstill function as models, or ―umbrella‖ documents, for 
the drafting of site-specific international agreements.  Consistency in the drafting of water 
rights instruments is desirable; embracing the common themes of equitability and 
sustainability is not only a noble but also an important cog in mainstreaming a less economic 
rights-centric, more human rights-driven message with respect to access to water.  In the 
meantime, understanding the economic motivations of riparian states and how these motives 
can be dovetailed to reach cooperative outcomes will have to suffice. 
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